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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                     
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
  
 In 1991, Sumitomo Machinery Corporation of America 
("Sumitomo") and AlliedSignal Inc. ("Allied") settled an 
environmental lawsuit concerning property sold to Sumitomo by a 
predecessor of Allied.  Their respective responsibilities were 
delineated in an Environmental Agreement ("Agreement") which 
incorporated a cleanup plan approved by the New Jersey Department 
of Environmental Protection ("NJDEP").1  In 1994, NJDEP tightened 
the radioactive remediation requirements applicable to the 
property, effectively giving Sumitomo the choice of executing a 
Declaration of Environmental Restrictions and Grant of Easement 
("DER") or remediating to a higher standard than originally 
approved.
                                                           
1
  In 1994, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 
and Energy ("NJDEPE") shortened its name to New Jersey Department 
of Environmental Protection. 
  A DER attaches to the title of the land and restricts certain 
future uses without NJDEP approval. 
 Before the district court, Allied argued that the 
Agreement unambiguously required Sumitomo to execute the DER, and 
Sumitomo argued that it unambiguously did not.  The district 
court denied Allied's request for specific performance or 
declaratory relief, finding that the Agreement unambiguously 
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placed the costs of remediation on Allied and did not require 
Sumitomo to enter into the DER.  We find the Agreement ambiguous 
and will reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. 
 Between 1937 and 1939, the Bendix Corporation 
("Bendix") acquired land in Teterboro, New Jersey.  At various 
times since 1939, Bendix used the land for a sewage treatment 
facility, a thorium/magnesium alloy foundry, a chemical treatment 
facility to dispose of the radioactive waste magnesium, and 
storage for various oils and solvents.  In 1977 Bendix subdivided 
its land and sold one parcel to Sumitomo.  The current litigation 
concerns the environmental cleanup of this parcel of land 
("Site"). 
 By 1988, government investigation had revealed 
radioactive contamination on the Site.  In 1984 Bendix had merged 
into Allied, and Allied, as successor, took the lead in 
formulating a remediation plan for all the land formerly owned by 
Bendix.  Meanwhile, Sumitomo moved its operations out-of-state in 
1988 and attempted to sell the Site.  To do so, Sumitomo had to 
institute a cleanup plan approved by NJDEP.  See Environmental 
Cleanup Responsibility Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 13:1K-6 to 13:1K-
13 (West 1991) ("ECRA"), repealed and replaced by Industrial Site 
Recovery Act of 1993, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 58:10B-1 to 58:10B-20 
(West Supp. 1995) ("ISRA"). 
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 Unsatisfied with Allied's efforts, Sumitomo hired Dames 
& Moore, an environmental consulting firm, to perform various 
environmental tests and to draw up a cleanup plan to submit to 
NJDEP.  In January 1991, Dames & Moore submitted an "ECRA 
Remedial Investigation and Cleanup Plan" ("Proposed Cleanup 
Plan") to NJDEP.  According to the plan, radioactive 
contamination would be remediated to 5 pCi/gm for the first  
15 cm. of soil, and 15 pCi/gm for any deeper soil ("5/15 
standard").2  Dames & Moore estimated that the plan would require 
excavating only 300 cubic feet of dirt to remove the "hot spots" 
of radiation that pushed the site over the 5/15 standard. 
 On August 30, 1991, NJDEP approved the Proposed Cleanup 
Plan in a letter ("Plan Approval").  It unconditionally approved 
the plan for radiological contamination, and no DER was required. 
In contrast, NJDEP required a DER for PCBs: 
2. PCBs in Soil. . .  
The proposal is acceptable provided that a deed 
restriction be placed on properties where elevated 
levels of contaminants are allowed to remain on-
site. . . .  The deed restriction shall not allow 
contaminated subsurface soil to be brought to the 
surface (0-2') above allowable levels. 
App. at 475.  NJDEP similarly required a DER for metals 
(chromium):  "Should the metal results be similar to those found 
in the earlier samples and the chromium is found to be in the 
trivalent form, no remedial action other than a deed restriction 
shall be required."  Id. 
                                                           
2
  "pCi/gm" stands for picocuries per gram, a standard of 
radiological activity. 
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 A model DER was attached to the Plan Approval.  It 
states that by executing a DER, the owner of property "impose[s] 
certain restrictions upon the use and occupancy of the Property, 
to restrict certain activities at the Property, and . . . 
grant[s] an easement to NJDEPE."  See App. at 301; see also  
24 N.J. Reg. 401 (proposed regulation N.J. Admin. Code 7:26D, 
Appendix A, "Model Document Declaration of Environmental 
Restrictions and Grant of Easement").  The owner agrees to avoid 
taking actions that may disturb clean soil covering contaminated 
land, or that may otherwise cause migration of contaminants.  The 
easement allows NJDEP to enter onto the land, inspect its 
condition, and do remedial work.  The DER is recorded and runs 
with the property until NJDEP executes and records a release. 
NJDEP, persons likely to suffer injury, and any citizen of New 
Jersey are entitled to enforce the DER.  Future owners are put on 
notice by the recordation, and the DER itself requires the owner 
to notify any lessees of the DER.    
 In April 1991, Sumitomo sued Allied under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 1994), to recover response 
costs for remediating the site.  In September 1991, a month after 
NJDEP approved Sumitomo's plan, the parties settled the suit, and 
each parties' responsibilities were laid out in the Agreement. 
Overall, the Agreement shifted the responsibility and costs of 
cleaning Sumitomo's land onto Allied.  The cleanup was to proceed 
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according to the Proposed Cleanup Plan as modified by the Plan 
Approval. 
 Allied attempted to go forward with the remediation, 
but found that the radiological contamination was more extensive 
than Dames & Moore had estimated.  It discovered soil with both 
radiological and chemical contamination, "mixed waste," which 
requires more extensive treatment.  The parties dispute what 
Allied then did, and the propriety of its actions.  What is 
undisputed is that tens of thousands of cubic feet of soil were 
excavated and stored on site instead of 300.  This soil met the 
plan's 5/15 standard and could be placed back on the Site under 
the original standard.  The remediation has taken much longer 
than the six months estimated by Dames & Moore. 
 Due to the delay and extensive excavation of soil, 
Sumitomo complained about Allied's remediation to NJDEP. Apprised 
of the new circumstances, NJDEP ordered the remediation to halt 
and requested an addendum to the Proposed Cleanup Plan. The 
parties jointly submitted a proposal which suggested the same 
5/15 standard ("Plan Addendum"). 
 NJDEP approved the Plan Addendum, but under the more 
stringent requirements of ISRA, which had been enacted after the 
Plan Approval.  The new legislation established two remediation 
standards, residential and nonresidential.  See § 58:10B-
12(c)(1).  The residential remediation standard refers to 
contaminant levels that do not exceed the health risk level 
appropriate for residential use, as determined by the agency. The 
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nonresidential standard refers to a higher risk level appropriate 
for uses that are not residential.  If a cleanup plan proposes to 
remediate real property to nonresidential standards, ISRA 
requires a DER to restrict use of the property to non-residential 
uses and other uses compatible with the extent of contamination 
and, in addition, restricts any activities that may bring 
contaminants above ground.  See § 58:10B-13(a)(2).   
 NJDEP determined that the residential remediation 
standard for the Site was 3 pCi/gm, based on NJDEP calculations 
of safe exposure levels for people.  It rejected the 5/15 
standard as creating too high a health risk for unrestricted use. 
The approval of the Plan Addendum required the Site to be cleaned 
to 3 pCi/gm, covered with one foot of uncontaminated fill, and a 
DER executed to insure that the cover remain in place.  Sumitomo 
and Allied filed formal objections to the new standard in 
accordance with NJDEP's dispute resolution process.  The new 
standard would be expensive.  The tens of thousands of cubic feet 
of soil stored on the Site could not be placed back onto the land 
because its contamination exceeded 3 pCi/gm; it would have to be 
shipped for disposal, a costly proposition.  According to Allied, 
it might also have to raze a warehouse on the property to treat 
the underlying soil.  Exposing the underlying soil would obligate 
Allied to remediate other contaminants that were otherwise 
acceptable in place and covered by the warehouse. 
 Before resolution, Sumitomo withdrew its objection to 
the new standard and requested NJDEP to enforce it. Nevertheless, 
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Allied pursued dispute resolution, arguing that the agency had 
improperly calculated the correct residential standard and that 
the proper standard was the original 5/15 standard. NJDEP 
eventually agreed that its standard was too stringent, but did 
not agree that the Site could be unrestricted at the 5/15 
standard.  In its letter to Allied dated December 1994, NJDEP 
stated: 
The NJDEP agrees with your position that the 
radiological criteria for this site should be 
5 pCi/gm above background in the first six 
inches of soil and 15 pCi/gm in any 
subsequent six inch layer for [various 
radiological contaminants]. . . . 
 
However, the NJDEP does not agree with your 
proposal regarding the issue of unrestricted 
use.  Be advised that, in accordance with 
P.L. 1993, c.139, an institutional and/or an 
engineering control, in the form of a 
Declaration of Environmental Restriction, 
will be required if any concentrations will 
remain in the soils greater than 5 pCi/gm. 
This will ensure that any affected soils will 
not be disturbed.  "Unrestricted use" will be 
approved when soil concentrations are less 
than 5 pCi/gm throughout the soil column. 
App. at 202.  In effect, NJDEP had changed the residential 
standard applicable to Allied's cleanup from 3 pCi/gm to  
5 pCi/gm, but had not altered ISRA's statutory DER requirement. 
Thus, Allied could still remediate to the 5/15 standard in the 
Proposed Cleanup Plan and Plan Approval, but Sumitomo would have 
to agree to execute a DER.  Alternatively, Allied could remediate 
the entire soil column to 5 pCi/gm. 
 Despite continued efforts by Allied, NJDEP did not 
change its standards any further.  Sumitomo would not execute a 
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DER for the 5/15 standard, so Allied requested the district court 
to determine, on an expedited basis, whether Sumitomo must do so 
under the Agreement.  By its terms, the Agreement is governed by 
the laws of New Jersey, and the parties did not argue otherwise. 
After reviewing the parties' briefs and affidavits accompanying 
the motion, the district court ruled for Sumitomo, finding that 
under New Jersey law, the Agreement unambiguously did not 
obligate Sumitomo to enter into the DER, and to the contrary, 
placed the burden of regulatory change upon Allied.  This appeal 
followed.   
 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have jurisdiction to 
entertain an appeal from the final order of the district court. 
The original suit was brought under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, which 
vests original and exclusive jurisdiction in federal district 
courts.  See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b) (1994).  In the consent order 
filed in conjunction with the settlement, the district court 
retained jurisdiction to enforce the Agreement and properly heard 
Allied's motion. 
 Allied asks us to interpret the Agreement unambiguously 
to require the DER, or in the alternative, to find the Agreement 
ambiguous and remand for an evidentiary hearing.  We agree with 
Allied's alternative argument and hold that the Agreement is 
ambiguous as to whether Sumitomo must execute the radiological 
DER, and the factual issue of intent must be resolved on remand. 
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II. 
 When resolving a contract dispute, the initial 
determination is whether the contract is ambiguous concerning the 
dispute between the parties, an issue of law afforded plenary 
review.  See Teamsters Indus. Emp. Welfare Fund v. Rolls-Royce, 
989 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 A contract is ambiguous "where the contract is 
susceptible of more than one meaning."  Briggs v. United Shoe 
Machinery Corp., 92 N.J. Eq. 277, 287, 114 A. 538, 542 (N.J.), 
cert. denied, 254 U.S. 653 (1920).  In American Cyanamid Co. v. 
Fermenta Animal Health Co., 54 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 1995), we had 
occasion to consider how a New Jersey court would determine 
whether there is "more than one meaning":  
[T]he Supreme Court of New Jersey summarized 
this area of the law in the following terms: 
 
 Evidence of the 
circumstances is always admissible 
in aid of the interpretation of an 
integrated agreement.  This is so 
even when the contract on its face 
is free from ambiguity.  The 
polestar of construction is the 
intention of the parties to the 
contract as revealed by the 
language used, taken as an 
entirety; and, in the quest for the 
intention, the situation of the 
parties, the attendant 
circumstances, and the objects they 
were thereby striving to attain are 
necessarily to be regarded. . . . 
 
[Atlantic Northern Airlines, Inc. v. 
Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 301, 96 A.2d 652, 656 
(N.J. 1953).] 
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 It is important for 
present purposes to note that 
extrinsic evidence of the 
negotiations, conduct and other 
circumstances of the parties is 
important to a court's analysis of 
whether an agreement is ambiguous 
only to the extent, if any, that 
such evidence provides "objective 
indicia that, from the linguistic 
reference point of the parties, the 
terms of the contract are 
susceptible of different meanings." 
Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business 
Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1011 
(3d Cir. 1980).  That is, extrinsic 
evidence is permitted because the 
law recognizes that the meaning of 
words can depend on context, and 
what may seem unambiguous without 
context (or in the context that the 
judge may hypothesize, based on his 
or her own experience) may be 
ambiguous when understood from the 
"linguistic reference point of the 
parties."  Id.  See 3 Arthur L. 
Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 542 
(1960).  Cf. 4 Samuel Williston & 
Walter H.E. Jaeger, A Treatise on 
the Laws of Contracts § 601, at 
310-11 (3d ed. 1961). 
 
Id. at 181-82.  We now turn to the Agreement to ascertain whether 
it is susceptible to more than one meaning. 
 The district court found that in the Agreement, Allied 
unambiguously agreed to pay "all costs" of the required cleanup: 
 1.  Assumption of Cleanup Responsibilities. 
Subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, 
ALLIED-SIGNAL shall from and after the effective date 
of this Agreement assume full responsibility for: 
 
. . . . 
 
b)  payment of all costs incurred after the 
effective date of this Agreement relating to or 
arising from: 
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. . . . 
   (3) the conduct of any work at the 
Site or compliance with requirements 
that may be imposed by the NJDEPE or 
other federal, state or local 
governmental authorities relating to or 
arising from such Existing Environmental 
Conditions, including, but not limited 
to, the posting of required financial 
assurances, (the "Work"). 
App. at 269 (emphasis added).  It also undertook the risk and 
cost of more stringent regulations: 
 5.  Implementation of Cleanup Plan. . . .  If new, 
more stringent laws or regulations are enacted which 
require additional work to be performed at the Site 
with respect to such Existing Environmental Conditions, 
ALLIED-SIGNAL shall comply with such laws or 
regulations to the extent required by the NJDEPE. . . . 
Id. at 272.  
 Allied acknowledges that the preceding Agreement terms 
required it to remediate to the extent required by the NJDEP, 
including any requirement based on a change of law.  According to 
Allied, the ambiguity, if any there be, resides in what 
remediation is "required" within the meaning of the Agreement 
when the NJDEP gives the landowner an option between (a) 
remediating to the standard proposed by the landowner and 
accepting a DER limiting future use and (b) remediating to a 
substantially higher standard at substantial additional expense. 
Allied correctly points out that nothing in the Agreement 
expressly speaks to what "required" means in this context.  It 
argues, however, that Paragraph 6 of the Agreement unambiguously 
reflects an understanding between the parties that "any DER which 
the NJDEP [might] impose or require for the Site" as a result of 
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their joint proposal would be accepted by Sumitomo, as the 
landowner, so that Allied would not be required to perform more 
remediation than set forth in that joint proposal.  Paragraph 6 
provides:    
 6.  Cooperation in Sale or Lease of Site.  ALLIED-
SIGNAL shall cooperate fully with SUMITOMO in the event 
of a sale or lease of all or a portion of the 
Site. . . .  SUMITOMO shall provide any such purchaser 
or lessee with a copy of this Agreement and any 
"Declaration of Environmental Restrictions and Grant of 
Easement" ("Deed Restrictions") which the NJDEPE may 
impose or require for the Site.  SUMITOMO or any such 
purchaser or lessee shall fully comply with the terms 
of such Deed Restrictions which limit utilization of 
the Site.  ALLIED-SIGNAL shall comply with the terms of 
such Deed Restrictions that are applicable to its 
conduct of the Work and shall pay for any portion of 
the Work required by the NJDEPE as part of any "Deed 
Restrictions." 
 
Id. at 273-74 (emphasis added). 
 The district court was unpersuaded by Allied's 
interpretation of Paragraph 6.  It was important to the court 
that Sumitomo had never agreed specifically to a radiological DER 
and that NJDEP had approved the original remediation plan without 
one.  Paragraph 6 could not be read to obligate Sumitomo to enter 
into the radiological DER because NJDEP had not "imposed or 
required" it, and the Agreement plainly referred to only DERs 
"imposed or required".  As a result of the dispute resolution 
process, the radiological DER was one of two alternatives, the 
proposed 5/15 remediation standard plus a DER, or remediation to 
5 pCi/gm for the entire soil column. 
  After considering the alternative interpretations of 
the Agreement, we find Paragraph 6 ambiguous concerning 
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Sumitomo's obligations with respect to the radiological DER. 
While we agree with the district court that Paragraph 6 can 
reasonably be read to impose no relevant obligation on Sumitomo, 
we also find it reasonable to interpret the paragraph as 
reflecting an understanding that Sumitomo would execute a DER 
such as the one at issue here.  The district court erred in its 
interpretation of "imposed and required," and should have found 
Allied's interpretation also to be a reasonable one. 
 It is important at the outset to put Paragraph 6 in the 
regulatory context in which it was negotiated.  The regulatory 
scheme in place at the time the Agreement was negotiated is, of 
course, competent extrinsic evidence concerning the meaning the 
parties gave to their descriptions of agency action.   
 ISRA gives the owner of contaminated property a choice 
between a DER or a more stringent remediation standard.  Property 
may be remediated to a standard less stringent than the 
residential soil remediation standard if a DER is executed, see  
§ 58:10B-13(a), but NJDEP may not impose a DER without the 
consent of the owner.  See § 58:10B-12(h)(3).  If the owner does 
not consent, he or she is required to remediate to the 
residential soil remediation standard.  See § 58:10B-13(b). While 
ISRA may properly be viewed as a more "stringent law" within the 
meaning of Paragraph 5 of the Agreement, its imposition of a DER 
as a condition of utilizing a less strict standard continues the 
practice that existed prior to ISRA.   
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 The imposition of a DER is a responsive regulatory 
process.  The owner of contaminated land submits a cleanup plan, 
and in response to the proposal, NJDEP may impose or require a 
DER.  That is what it means to "impose or require" a DER, and the 
parties must have understood this meaning at the time of the 
Agreement was negotiated and executed.  Dames & Moore submitted 
the Proposed Cleanup Plan on behalf of Sumitomo in January of 
1991, as required by ECRA.  In August, NJDEP responded with its 
Plan Approval, approving the plans for some contaminants 
unconditionally, and imposing DERs on the proposed cleanup of 
other contaminants. 
 NJDEP imposed the radiological DER in the same manner. 
Sumitomo proposed the 5/15 standard in the original cleanup plan. 
When NJDEP requested the Plan Addendum, Sumitomo, together with 
Allied, proposed the 5/15 standard again.  In response, NJDEP 
imposed much stricter requirements.  Through dispute resolution 
NJDEP relaxed the new requirements, and in the end only imposed a 
DER on the 5/15 standard proposed in the Plan Addendum.  The 
radiological DER was imposed and required in the responsive 
regulatory process typical for a cleanup plan, a process the 
parties were aware of when they executed the Agreement. 
 Sumitomo would read "imposed or required" as meaning 
only DERs absolutely imposed or required, with no choice or 
option given.  This interpretation is untenable.  A DER is always 
optional in the sense that contaminated land could always be 
remediated to such a clean level that no DER could be required. 
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In the Plan Approval, NJDEP required a DER for PCBs so long as 
"elevated levels of contaminants are allowed to remain on site." 
Impliedly, if Sumitomo had proposed to remediate PCBs below 
"elevated levels" throughout the Site, NJDEP would not have 
imposed a DER.  Where a DER may be required, an owner of land 
always has the choice of the DER or remediating to the 
residential standard.     
 If "imposed or required" were read throughout the 
Agreement to exclude any regulations or laws imposed in the form 
of alternatives, Allied could not be required to remediate to the 
more stringent standard.  Paragraph 1(b)(3) states that Allied 
will pay "all costs . . . arising from . . . compliance with 
requirements that may be imposed by the NJDEPE," and Paragraph 5 
states that Allied will comply with "more stringent laws or 
regulations," but only "to the extent required by the NJDEPE." 
(emphasis added).  Here, NJDEP required either that a 
radiological DER be executed or that the entire soil column be 
remediated to the residential standard.  Just as the radiological 
DER was not absolutely imposed on Sumitomo, neither was the more 
stringent standard absolutely imposed on Allied.  If we followed 
Sumitomo's reading of "imposed or required" to its logical 
conclusion, DERs would fall outside the scope of the Agreement. 
 With this background we return to the key provision of 
Paragraph 6:  "SUMITOMO shall provide any such purchaser or 
lessee with a copy of this Agreement and any "Declaration of 
Environmental Restrictions and Grant of Easement" ("Deed 
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Restriction") which the NJDEPE may impose or require for the 
Site."  If Sumitomo has any obligation to execute a radiological 
DER, it arises from this provision.  
 As the district court found, Paragraph 6 can reasonably 
be read to create no obligation on Sumitomo's part to accept a 
DER.  The paragraph generally concerns the duties of the parties 
in the event of a sale or lease of the Site.  Read in this 
context, Sumitomo may have undertaken only the duty to provide a 
purchaser or lessee with copies of any DER that happened to be 
attached to the land at the time of transfer.  The key provision 
in Paragraph 6 refers to a duty to provide a "copy of this 
Agreement and any [DER]."  The listing of the Agreement as well 
as any DER suggests that the clause creates a duty to provide 
copies of certain documents, not a duty to execute those 
documents.  Nowhere in Paragraph 6 is it explicitly stated that 
Sumitomo has a duty to execute a DER. 
 However, it is also entirely reasonable to interpret 
Paragraph 6 as creating a duty to execute future DERs.   The 
paragraph is entitled "Cooperation in Sale or Lease of Site," but 
it is also the place in the Agreement where the parties discuss 
their obligations with respect to DERs.  The second half of the 
paragraph not only discusses Sumitomo's promise to provide any 
DER imposed or required by NJDEP, but it also discusses each of 
the parties' obligations to comply with the terms of any such 
DER.  Most important, the obligation assumed by Sumitomo in 
Paragraph 6 is not stated in terms of "currently existing DERs" 
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or "any DER that Sumitomo may hereafter accept."  Sumitomo 
commits itself to deliver "any [DER] which the NJDEPE may impose 
or require for the Site."  Given that the only DER that would be 
of any concern to a purchaser of the Site would be those that had 
been accepted by Sumitomo, it is not unreasonable to suggest that 
the obligation to deliver any DER which NJDEP might impose or 
require necessarily presupposed that Sumitomo would accept any 
DER that NJDEP might propose as a condition of approving its 
proposal. 
 
III. 
 In connection with their cross motions for summary 
judgment, Allied and Sumitomo submitted affidavits of their 
representatives during the course of the negotiation of this 
Agreement.  In his affidavit, James A. Schutt, Allied's 
representative, averred that "the parties specifically discussed 
the appropriateness of using clean up standards that took into 
consideration the future use of the Site as industrial property 
and that a DER [might] be required."  According to Schutt, the 
Sumitomo representatives "agreed that industrial standards were 
appropriate, [and] that a DER was acceptable."  App. at 211. 
Sumitomo's President, William M. Lechler, insisted in this 
affidavit, however, that "Sumitomo never committed to entering 
into a DER for any kind of contamination."  App. at 512.  The 
extrinsic evidence presented by the parties was thus in conflict. 
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 When a contract is ambiguous, the "fact-finder must 
attempt to discover what the contracting parties . . . intended 
[the disputed provisions] to mean."  Teamsters Indus. Emp. 
Welfare Fund, 989 F.2d at 136.  In order to make such a 
determination, "objective evidence in support of [the competing] 
interpretation[s] should be considered by the fact finder." 
Mellon Bank, 619 F.2d at 1011.  When there is a material conflict 
in the extrinsic evidence concerning the objective context of the 
contract, the trier of fact has no choice but to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing and resolve the conflict.  On remand, the 
district court will hear all relevant extrinsic evidence the 
parties wish to tender, will resolve any conflict in that 
evidence, and will make findings of fact with respect to the 
intent of the parties.   
    
IV. 
   We will reverse the judgment of the district court 
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
